The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project|
Competition Versus Cooperation:
 For NASA personnel
interested in fostering cooperative projects with the Soviet Union,
the political climate of 1959-1962 was frustrating. These were the
years of Soviet Premier Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's foreign
policy that on the one hand sought detente with the West while on the
other exploited "every major trouble spot, every embarrassment" to
damage Western influence and prestige. To quote one
There appeared to be two
Khrushchevs: one, a "coexistentialist" eager for enhanced intercourse
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; dropping hints (to be sure so
obscure as to remain at the time undecipherable) about the necessity
for a virtual alliance of the two powers; the other, a militant
Communist and bully ready to cash in on each and every weakness and
hesitation of the West, threatening nuclear obliteration if his
opponent would not submit.
Khrushchev did not want a crisis that would
lead inexorably to nuclear disaster, but he was a skillful poker
player who successfully bluffed the leaders of the country that had
originated the game, until the confrontation over missiles in
Nineteen fifty-nine was a year of political
maneuvering. Vice President Richard Nixon and Premier Khrushchev held
their "kitchen debate" at an American exhibition in Moscow's
Sokolniki Park,31 and Khrushchev later made his ostentatious, but
largely ceremonial, visit to the U.S. It was also the year of the
first Soviet lunar probes. Luna
I, launched in January, was the first
spacecraft to penetrate interplanetary space; Luna II, launched during
the Premier's visit to the U.S., was the first spacecraft to hit the
moon. Then in October, Luna
III swung around the moon and
photographed its back side. But the debates and visits did nothing to
solve international problems; successful moon probes certainly did
not enhance the chances for cooperation between the two nations -
especially when contrasted with the high number of U.S. launch
failures in 1959.
In the next year, however, Soviet and American
heads of state had to deal with realities of international politics
that could not be brushed aside. Khrushchev had wanted a summit
meeting for several years; now such a meeting seemed less than
desirable. Following his visit to the United States, Khrushchev had
visited Peking. From the Soviet standpoint, discussions with the
Chinese were unsatisfactory, causing the ideological split between
the two nations to widen and heading the Chinese on an increasingly
independent course. This problem, together with the hardening
positions of the American, British, and French on the question of two
Germanys, made a summit meeting with the Americans undesirable. Just
as the potentially embarrassing get- together approached, American
pilot Francis Gary Powers  became an
unintentional celebrity when his Lockheed U-2 high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft was downed deep in Soviet territory.
The U-2 incident had three immediate
consequences. First, it solved Khrushchev's dilemma. He could now
avoid the summit meeting without accepting the responsibility for
wrecking it. Second, the United States suffered a serious
international embarrassment when President Eisenhower took personal
responsibility for the U-2 flight.32 Third, the credibility of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration was questioned because it had served as a cover
for this clandestine, intelligence-gathering overflight.
On 5 May 1960, on orders from the White House,
NASA stated that one of its U-2 research planes used "to study
gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude" had been
missing since 1 May. Then six days later, Eisenhower admitted
publicly that the flight actually had been part of a military
reconnaissance program conducted with his permission. While the
administration had to cope with the impact of the U-2 mission at the
abortive Paris summit conference and later during Khrushchev's visit
to the United Nations in September, NASA had to fight the notion that
there was more to the civilian program than was being admitted in
An immediate issue was Soviet participation in
the Tiros weather satellite program. "It's part of our national
policy that space research is for peaceful purposes," Arnold Frutkin
told a Wall Street
Journal reporter. "We want to have an
open program. And the best way to prove this to other countries is to
have them participate in our experiments."33 NASA had long planned to solicit the cooperation of
other nations, including the U.S.S.R., in studying cloud photographs
taken by the Tiros satellite. Soviet participation would have gone a
long way to allay fears that Tiros was looking at more than the
weather patterns, but the Soviets saw - or purported to see - the
satellite as another U-2. A year later NASA Administrator James E.
Webb labeled as "political opportunism" their attacks on the Tiros
program and their refusal to participate.34
Even without the U-2 incident, 1960 was not a
propitious time to talk about cooperative ventures in space. The
American public was watching a very close political contest between
John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon; a key campaign topic was the state
of the nation's defenses against nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.
During the campaign, the trade journal Missiles and Rockets
invited the candidates to respond to a series of statements on space
and defense. The first proposition asked if they would "recognize as
national policy that we are in a strategic space race with Russia."
Kennedy's response was published first:
We are in a strategic space race
with the Russians, and we have been losing. The first man-made
satellite to orbit the earth was named Sputnik. The first
living creature in space was Laika. The first rocket to the moon
carried a Red  flag. The first
photograph of the far side of the moon was made with a Soviet camera.
If a man orbits earth his year his name will be Ivan. These are
unpleasant facts that the Republican candidate would prefer us to
forget. Control of space will be divided in the next decade. If the
Soviets control space they can control earth, as in past centuries
the nation that controlled the seas dominated the continents. This
does not mean that the United States desires more rights in space
than any other nation. But we cannot run second in this vital race.
To insure peace and freedom, we must be first.35
Nixon responded later in a manner that was
uncharacteristic of the Eisenhower administration, which had played
down the idea of a space race. Candidate Nixon argued:
If the Eisenhower Administration
had not long ago recognized that we were in a strategic race with
Russia, our space record would not be as creditable as it is today.
Twenty-six satellites and 2 space probes have been launched
successfully by the United States. Six satellites and 2 space probes
have been launched successfully by the Soviet Union. Today 13 United
States satellites are in orbit; only 1 Russian satellite remains in
orbit. Eight United States satellites in orbit are still
transmitting; the sole Russian satellite in orbit is not
transmitting. The United States has recovered 2 satellite payloads
from orbit while the U.S.S.R. claims to have recovered one. Despite
the greater weight of U.S.S.R. space vehicles, the United States has
gathered far more scientific information from space. In
instrumentation, communications, electronics, reliability, and
guidance, United States space vehicles have made gigantic strides. In
short, the United States is not losing the space race or any other
race with the Soviet Union. Today we are ahead of the U.S.S.R. From a
standing start in 1953, we have forged ahead to overcome an 8-year
Russian lead. And we will continue to maintain a clear cut lead in
the race for space.36
While the candidates debated, NASA and the
Eisenhower administration attempted to keep a line open with the
Soviets on space cooperation. Frutkin had talked informally with
Academician Anatoliy Arkadyevich Blagonravov about the possibility of
using Echo I, the balloon-like passive communications satellite,
for communications experiments between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Echo I had been launched on 12 August 1960, three days before
the International Astronautical Congress convened in Stockholm, and
the delegates had heard a message recorded by President Eisenhower,
transmitted part of the way by the satellite.37 On 22 September, the President in an address to the
United Nations suggested a  four-point proposal
for the peaceful exploration of space, using as his precedent the
1959 Antarctic Treaty, which had prompted scientific research and
barred military activity from that continent.38 However, the future of Eisenhower's hope for an
agreement on the peaceful uses of outer space would depend upon the
efforts of the new President and the individuals within NASA.
Kennedy's election in November 1960 portended
a number of changes for defense and space programs. Subsequently,
Kennedy asked his Vice President-elect to serve as his senior adviser
on space policy and as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space
Council. Lyndon B. Johnson's first task was to recommend a new
Administrator for NASA, Glennan having resigned effective the last
day of the Eisenhower administration. As Johnson began the search,
Kennedy announced on 11 January 1961 the appointment of Jerome B.
Wiesner of MIT to be his assistant for science and technology. The
same month appeared the "Wiesner Report," prepared by a committee of
science advisers who had worked with the Kennedy campaign.
Expanding upon campaign themes, this document
criticized the space program under the Eisenhower administration. But
while belaboring some aspects, especially the manned space-flight
project, the report foresaw "exciting possibilities for international
cooperation" in space exploration and communications. Such projects
would prosper if "carried out in an atmosphere of cooperation as
projects of all mankind instead of in the present atmosphere of
national competition."39 Kennedy pursued the same theme in his inaugural
Kennedy's speech was notable because of its
hopeful and skillful rhetoric, expressing the desire for new
beginnings in foreign policy, including a reduction in the level of
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. To that end,
he appealed to the Soviets: "Let both sides seek to invoke the
wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore
the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean
depths and encourage the arts and commerce. . . ." And Kennedy
continued to espouse the cooperative theme in his State of the Union
address on 30 January 1961. The President invited all nations,
including the U.S.S.R., "to join with us in developing a weather
prediction program, in a new communications satellite program and in
preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes
which may someday unlock the deepest secrets of the universe." He
repeated the hopes of his science advisers that the arms race could
be kept from spreading into space. "Both nations would help
themselves as well as other nations by removing these endeavors from
the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War." This was to be
a recurring theme in Kennedy's public comments.40
At the time of these pronouncements, and to
this day, debate has  existed over the
depth of the new President's initial understanding of the space issue
relative to the realities of international power
politics.41 Missiles and space had been a warm issue during the
campaign; Kennedy had insisted that the previous administration had
allowed national defense to slip in relation to Soviet strength.
After Kennedy assumed the Presidency, the "missile gap" proved to
have been a myth; but the problem remained to fit the national space
program into the power equation by which American military and
political leaders would evaluate the "strength" of their nation
versus that of the Soviet Union.
Ten days after his inauguration, Kennedy
followed the recommendation of his Vice President and nominated James
E. Webb to be Administrator of the space agency. At first hesitant to
accept the position, which he felt would have been more
satisfactorily filled by a scientist or engineer, Webb had agreed
once he understood that Kennedy was seeking a policy maker who could
manage scientists and engineers. Upon accepting the assignment, Webb
announced that Hugh Dryden, the other presidential appointee in NASA,
would continue as Deputy Administrator. With directions from the
President to make a comprehensive review of NASA programs, Webb went
before the Senate for hearings on his confirmation. He was confirmed
on 9 February and sworn in on the 14th.42
As the first months of 1961 slipped away,
Kennedy and Webb became convinced that second place in space
exploration would carry the negative impression that the United
States was second rate in military strength as well. This conclusion
once again pointed to the dilemma of competition versus cooperation
in space exploitation. On the one hand, Kennedy genuinely wanted to
cooperate in this arena with the Soviets; on the other hand, military
and technical superiority had to remain with the United States.
Events during the spring of 1961 swiftly determined his choice
between these conflicting goals.
The successful one-orbit flight of Yuri
Alekseyevich Gagarin on 12 April 1961 was a significant element in
the subsequent American deliberations. While this event was
anticipated by the Kennedy administration, the Soviet feat was still
another blow to the American image at home and abroad. The Soviet
Union constantly stressed three themes in exploiting the first manned
- the Gagarin flight was evidence of the
virtues of "victorious socialism";
- the flight was evidence of the global
superiority of the Soviet Union in all aspects of science and
- the Soviet Union, despite the ability to
translate this superiority into powerful military weapons, wanted
world peace and general disarmament.43
Such a challenge could not go unanswered.
Theodore Sorenson later commented, overdramatically perhaps, that "As
the Soviet Union capitalized  on its historic feat
in all corners of the globe, Kennedy congratulated Khrushchev and
Gagarin and set to work."44
Even as John Kennedy was rolling up his
sleeves and consulting his advisers, other events were unfolding that
would complicate the political scene. None too secretly, a band of
approximately 1,500 Cuban refugees was preparing to launch an
invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. The exact impact of this military
and political fiasco on the subsequent decision to go to the moon has
been repeatedly argued by many of those associated with the Kennedy
administration. John Logsdon concludes in his study of the
The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs
reinforced Kennedy's determination, already strong, to approve a
program aimed at placing the United States ahead of the Soviet Union
in the competition for firsts in space. It was one of the many
pressures that converged on the president at the time, and thus its
exact influence cannot be isolated. As president, Kennedy could treat
few issues in isolation anyway , and there seems to be little doubt
that the Bay of Pigs was in the front of his mind as he called Lyndon
Johnson to his office on April 19 and asked him to find a "space
program which promises dramatic results in which we could
By the end of April 1961, Kennedy had decided
that the dramatic program would be a manned lunar landing. The
suborbital flight of Alan B. Shepard in his Freedom 7 spacecraft on
5 May was a much needed positive accomplishment, which brought
favorable public response. On 8 May, Vice President Johnson presented
to the President a memorandum prepared by NASA Administrator Webb and
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara - "Recommendations for our
National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals." The Webb-McNamara
memorandum suggested that manned space flight could be an effective
means of enhancing national prestige:
Major successes, such as orbiting
a man as the Soviets have just done, lend national prestige even
though the scientific, commercial or military value of the
undertaking may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically
unjustified. . . . The non-military, non-commercial, non- scientific
but "civilian" projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are,
in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold
John Kennedy agreed.
On 25 May in a speech on "Urgent National
Needs," the President reminded the Congress that "these are
extraordinary times. We face an extraordinary challenge." After
addressing himself to a number of other important issues, Kennedy
turned to the subject of space. This new frontier was just another
aspect of the "battle that is going on around the world between
freedom and tyranny. . . ." Therefore, "Now it is time to take longer
strides - time for a great new American enterprise - time for this
nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in
many ways may  hold the key to our
future on earth." One of those "longer strides" Kennedy proposed was
the landing of an American on the moon. The President believed "that
the Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely
to earth." This goal was that bold type of challenge that had
peculiar appeal to the young President. "No single space project in
this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for
the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or
expensive to accomplish."47
Thus, space competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union was reaffirmed by Kennedy's speech. What
did this mean to NASA, and particularly what did it mean for NASA's
mandate to cooperate? During 1961, the NASA position on the prospects
of Soviet-American space cooperation was one of basic skepticism.
Administrator Webb was committed by the Webb- McNamara memorandum of
8 May to support a program of American technological pre- eminence in
space. Any program of cooperation would have to occur within a
framework that would not jeopardize America's chances of establishing
In June 1961, in response to questioning, NASA
submitted a series of formal statements to the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. "In general, how cooperative have
the Soviets been in sharing the results of their space experiments?"
NASA responded that the difference between the attitude of the U.S.
and that of the U.S.S.R. was one of degree. The Soviets were judged
to have been quite active in international meetings.
In a 25 May 1961 address to joint
session of the U.S. Congress, President John F. Kennedy establishes
the goal "of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to
earth" before the decade is out.
 They had presented
papers and discussed problems of mutual interest with their
international colleagues, but it was the NASA opinion that they had
not operated with an openness comparable to that of scientists from
other nations.48 Throughout 1961, NASA spokesmen told Congress and the
American public that while NASA still sought space cooperation with
the U.S.S.R., the attitude and actions of the Soviets left little
hope for success.
Public remarks by Soviet officials in 1961 on
space cooperation were equally ambivalent. On 13 February, Kennedy
congratulated Khrushchev on the launch of a space probe to
Venus.49 In his reply two days later,
Khrushchev thanked Kennedy for his "high
appraisal to this outstanding achievement of peaceful science." The
Soviet leader, in referring to Kennedy's inaugural and State of the
Union invitations to the Soviets, said that "such an approach . . .
impresses us and we welcome these utterances of yours." But the
Soviet Premier still saw disarmament as the key to the problem: "We
consider that favorable conditions for the most speedy solution of
these noble tasks facing humanity would be created through the
settlement of the problem of disarmament."50
With Gagarin's Vostok I April flight,
the tone of the Soviet statements on cooperation in space changed.
Clearly the Soviets enjoyed their sense of technological superiority,
but still they did not totally abandon the thought of cooperation
with the U.S. Academician Sedov,* in his public congratulations to Alan Shepard for
suborbital flight, was careful to point out that the Gagarin flight
was of greater significance. He also restated the Soviet position on
the relationship of international cooperation in space flight to the
question of disarmament:
Soviet scientists and scientists
of other countries, who are occupied with scientific research in
space, are participating in mutual discussions on the results
achieved, and we can speak on the beginning of fruitful cooperation.
Nonetheless, the problem of international scientific cooperation on
space flights in general is still not resolved. It is evident that
such cooperation will be successful only upon the favorable
development of international relations and the realistic solution of
the problem of disarmament.51
Later at the Washington meetings of the
International Astronautical Federation during October, Sedov was
asked if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be able to collaborate in
launching large payloads. Sedov replied, "I think it will be possible
in the future, not only between the Russians and Americans but with
other countries as well."  Deputy Administrator
Dryden observed at the time that "Sedov and I have discussed this
possibility many times. If the decision were ours alone, there would
be no problem."52 Coming at a time when East-West tensions had worsened,
optimistic statements about cooperation in space hardly seemed
realistic. The two-day confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev
during the June 1961 Vienna summit was from Kennedy's perspective a
disaster. But in one of the rare moments of amicability, Kennedy
suggested that the two nations pool their space efforts and "go to
the moon together." Khrushchev's immediate response was "all right,"
but upon reflection the mercurial Soviet leader decided that such a
venture would not be practical. The boosters used for manned space
flight had military implications. That triggered considerations of
disarmament, and that brought the discussions back to the Cold War.
There the proposed joint trip to the moon died.53
The unsuccessful Vienna summit was followed by
the crisis over the Berlin Wall. With that physical barrier between
East and West Berlin erected on 13 August 1961, Khrushchev once again
raised the question of the divided status of Germany. For the second
time in three years, Khrushchev threatened to sign a separate peace
treaty with the East German Government, thus forcing the Americans to
deal with a separate communist state. On 25 July, Kennedy told the
nation in a somber television address that the United States would go
to war should that become necessary to defend a free Berlin.
Khrushchev reacted strongly to what he perceived to be an ultimatum
from the President of the United States, and while the two sides
negotiated the Berlin issue, the Soviet Union dramatically broke the
three-year old moratorium on atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.
Beginning on 1 September 1961, the tests continued for two months.
They were culminated with a 58-megaton explosion, the most powerful
hydrogen device to have been tested at that time by either
nation.54 While events such as these would seem to pose
insurmountable barriers to cooperation in space, Russian and American
scientists managed to keep the discussions alive.
Threats to world peace posed by the succession
of summer and autumn crises, while not unnoticed, seemed far distant
from the pleasant atmosphere of the lodge at Smugglers Notch,
Vermont. For four days, 5-8 September 1961, scientists from ten
countries, including the U.S.S.R., gathered for the Seventh
International Conference on Science and World Affairs.**  Included in a broad
spectrum of proposals relating to greater cooperation among the
world's scientists were suggestions for a program of space
cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Four areas in which the
scientists felt that cooperation was possible were (1) a worldwide
system of weather satellites and forecasting; (2) an international
program of communications satellites; (3) an international exchange
of data relating to space biology; and (4) a joint program for the
scientific exploration of the moon and the planets.55 Despite the international debate engendered by the
Soviet resumption of nuclear arms tests, there was an atmosphere of
good will at Smugglers Notch.56 The fragility of such scientist-to-scientist efforts
was clearly demonstrated two months later.
In November 1961, NASA and the U.S. Department
of Commerce sponsored an International Satellite Workshop in
Washington. American representatives explained their plans for the
further exploitation of weather satellites and encouraged other
nations to participate in the gathering and use of satellite data.
The Americans expected delegates from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and
Czechoslovakia, since visas had been sought by representatives of
those countries. On the second day of the workshop, it became
apparent that the Soviets would not attend. To most contemporary
observers the lesson was clear: cooperation in space matters was a
political consideration that could be understood only in the broader
context of East-West relations.57 Nineteen sixty-one, the fifth year of the space age
and NASA's third, had not been a good year for space cooperation.
Indeed, as one commentator has reflected: "For all the style and
excitement of the new team, and all the great promise, 1961 was a
terrible year for the Kennedy Administration."58 International tensions would not lessen during 1962,
but the opportunity for cooperation in space would seem more real.
Two men would work hard to give that opportunity a chance to mature -
Hugh Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of
* Sedov was Chairman of
the Commission for the Promotion of Interplanetary Flights, U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences, as well as President of the International
** Americans present
included E. Rabinowitch, Professor of Biophysics, University of
Illinois; H. Brown, California Institute of Technology; P. Doty,
Harvard University; and I. I. Rabi, Professor of Physics, Columbia
University. The Soviets included A. A. Blagonravov; A. V. Topchiev,
Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences; I. Y. Tamm, physicist;
and N. N. Bogolubov, physicist. British representatives included
Professor P. M. S. Blackett, physicist, London University; Sir John
Cockcroft, nuclear physicist, Cambridge University; and the Rt. Hon.
Philip Noel-Baker. Henry Kissinger, Harvard, and George Kistiakowsky,
former science adviser to President Eisenhower, attended the sessions
The Rivals, p. 249.
31. Bela Kornitzer,
The Real Nixon: An Intimate
Biography (New York, 1960), pp.
297-310, gives material concerning the kitchen debate.
32. Strobe Talbot, tr.
and ed., Khruschev Remembers: The Last
Testament (Boston and Toronto, 1974),
33. NASA Hq News
Release, "Memo to the Press," 5 May 1960; and David Wise and Thomas
B. Ross, "The U-2 Affair: Memo to Press Hastily Drawn,"
Washington Star, 8 June 1962.
34. Louis Kraar, "Space
Partnerships," Wall Street
Journal, 26 Sept. 1960.
Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 23 July 1961, stated that Tiros III and
Midas III were comparable to the U-2: "A spy is a spy, no matter
what height it flies."
35. John F. Kennedy, "If
the Soviets Control Space . . . They Can Control Earth,"
Missiles and Rockets, 10 Oct. 1960, pp. 12-13; and in the same issue,
Clarke Newlon, "Kennedy's Stand on Defense and Space," p. 50.
36. Richard M. Nixon,
"Nixon: Military Has Mission to Defend Space," Missiles and Rockets, 31
Oct. 1960, pp. 10-11; in the same issue, "Candidates Views Compared,"
p. 12; and in the same issue, Clarke Newton, "Nixon Drops Party Line
on Space," p. 50.
International Cooperation in
Space, pp. 89-91.
38. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961
(Washington, 1961), pp. 714-715.
39. Ad Hoc Committee on
Space, Jerome B. Wiesner, Chairman, "Report to the President-Elect of
the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," 12 Jan. 1961; Swenson, Grimwood, and
New Ocean, pp. 304-306; W. H.
Lawrence, "Kennedy Warned of Space Setback," New York Times, 12 Jan.
1961; "Excerpts from Task Force's Report to Kennedy on U.S. Position
in Space Race," New York
Times, 12 Jan. 1961; and James Baar,
"Space Shake-up Coming," Missiles and
Rockets, 16 Jan. 1961, pp.
40. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington,
1962), pp. 1-2, 26-27, and 93-94.
41. The differing views
can be seen by comparing Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York,
1965), p. 524, with Logsdon, Decision
to Go to the Moon, p. 9 3.
42. Interview, Hugh L.
Dryden-Jay Holmes, 26 Mar. 1964.
Decision to Go to the
Moon, pp. 111-112.
Decision to Go to the
Moon, pp. 111-112.
46. Ibid., p.
47. Public Papers of John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 405-406.
48. U.S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1962, Hearings on
H.R. 6874, 87th Cong., 1st sess.,
1961, p. 155.
49. TWX, Kennedy to
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, 13 Feb. 1961, as printed in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Documents on International Aspects of
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, 1963, p. 190.
50. TWX, Khrushchev to
Kennedy, 15 Feb. 1961, ibid.
51. Sedov, "Sovetskii
Soyuz-pioner v osvoenii kosmosa" [The Soviet Union-pioneer in space],
Pravda, 9 May 1961.
52. William Beller,
"AIAC Stressing Peace," Missiles and
Rockets, 9 Oct. 1961, p. 14.
53. Dept. of State, Memo
of conversation, "Vienna Meeting between the President and Chairman
Khrushchev," 3 June 1961 [John F. Kennedy Library]; Pierre Salinger,
With Kennedy (Garden City, New York, 1966), p. 178.
With Kennedy, pp. 189-196; and Ulm, The Rivals, pp.
55. Harrison E.
Salisbury, "World Scientists Map Coordinations," New York Times, 8 Sept.
1961; and Salisbury, "Space Proposals for World Near,"
New York Times, 9 Sept. 1961.
56. For the tenor of the
time, see Harry Schwartz, "Khrushchev Presses Hard to Force
Settlement on His Terms," New York
Times, 11 Sept. 1961; John W. Finney,
"U.S. Tests to Preserve Lead over Soviets," New York Times, 11
Sept.1961; and Richard Lowenthal, "Negotiating with Russia - What's
the Use," New York Times
Magazine, 11 Sept. 1961, pp. 21 and
57. John W. Finney,
"Soviet Block Boycotts U.S. Weather Satellite Symposium,"
New York Times, 15 Nov. 1961.
58. David Halberstam,
The Best and the
Brightest (Greenwich, Conn., 1973), p.