The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project|
The First Dryden-Blagonravov
Agreement - 1962
As Soviet and American reporters analyzed the
exchange between their political leaders, NASA officials prepared for
discussions with the Soviets.20 With State Department help, the NASA Office of
International Programs drafted three informal position papers
expanding the major points of Kennedy's 7 March
letter.21 Dryden and Frutkin then traveled to New York City to
meet with Academician Blagonravov on 27 March for their first
exploratory talks; the exchanges were informal and
preliminary.* Both parties had agreed in advance that formal
negotiations would begin later. The Kennedy-Khrushchev letters were
discussed, but to Dryden "It became obvious as the talks proceeded
that Academician Blagonravov had left Moscow [either] before the
exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President
Kennedy, or so soon thereafter that he had not discussed the several
proposals in any detail with other scientists, and that he had
received few instructions from Moscow."22 Blagonravov promised to study the NASA position papers
and respond with formal position statements at a subsequent
Dryden believed that these first conversations
were "generally free of cold-war propaganda. On one or two occasions
there were remarks that cooperation could be on a much larger scale
if the disarmament negotiations were successful, but the main
interest seemed to be . . . finding possible...
A. A. Blagonravov and H. L. Dryden have
an informal chat in the lobby of the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations before beginning their talks on space cooperation, March 1962
(New York Times photo).
...beginning steps for cooperation." At one
juncture, Blagonravov raised the issue of American nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, and subsequently at a meeting in the Soviet mission
in New York City, he briefly mentioned spy satellites. Dryden replied
politely but firmly that his authority was limited to technical
matters; political and legal issues were outside his
authority.23 Frutkin later reported that "Blagonravov accepted this
position philosophically, not raising such issues
As Frutkin saw it, the Soviets seemed hesitant
to discuss the possibilities of cooperative efforts in space
medicine, even though this topic had been proposed by Khrushchev, and
Blagonravov quickly dismissed the American proposal to conduct
experiments with high-altitude balloons. He said that his country
disliked balloons, an obvious reference to American programs to
disseminate propaganda leaflets from balloons over Eastern
Europe.25 On the question that had been raised by Khrushchev's
letter concerning outer-space pollution, Blagonravov "expressed
concern" regarding the negative impact of one nation's experiments on
the scientific work of another. Specifically, he was referring to
Project West Ford, a target for Soviet criticism.** Frutkin also perceived that the Soviets were not eager
to become immediately involved in joint space flight. "Blagonravov
stated that  current programs
were too far along to permit coordination at this date. The
coordination of future programs . . . seemed
The guarded sense of optimism felt by Dryden
and Frutkin was expressed only in private.27 In a brief joint statement from Blagonravov and Dryden
on 30 March, the press was told that the representatives of the two
nations "have now concluded their preliminary discussions." They also
announced that they intended to meet again during either the COSPAR
sessions scheduled for 30 April-10 May in Washington or the meeting
of the Scientific-Technical and Juridical Subcommittee of the U.N.
Outer Space Committee. Additional scientists from both nations would
join in these technical discussions. This was not hard news, but the
statement indicated that both parties realized their work had just
Soviet public reaction to the proposed
cooperation was favorable. On 12 April 1962 at the
government-sponsored Cosmonautics Day celebrations, both Gagarin and
Titov were quoted in the Soviet press as favoring cooperation between
the two countries, especially if it led to a reduction in
armaments.*** 29 Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh, President of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, declared that he favored Soviet-American
space cooperation as a route toward the solution of many scientific
concerns.30 This basic theme was repeated in an interview with
Khrushchev by Gardner Cowles, editor of Look magazine.
Khrushchev saw a joint expedition to the moon as technically and
scientifically possible; only the political problem of the military
character of space rockets stood in the way.31
Reaction in the U.S. to space cooperation with
the Soviets was mixed. Glenn's flight had reassured many Americans
who had been worried about the nation's position in the space race.
Most public figures were still committed to establishing American
pre-eminence in space. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the ranking
Republican member of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee,
felt that the United States had little to gain from cooperation,
especially since the nation was committed to "superiority over Russia
on really important space development."32 However, Representative George P. Miller, Chairman of
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, approached the
possibility of cooperation in a more positive fashion. In welcoming
the Khrushchev overture to cooperate, Congressman Miller said, "This
is something we must do. We must accept their offer in good faith
unless, and until, proven otherwise. The world expects this of
us."33  The wider public
reaction seemed to mildly favor cooperation so long as it did not
have a negative impact on the American goal in space - the
Kennedy-inspired goal to reach the moon during this
Vice President Lyndon Johnson, on 10 May 1962,
summed up the feelings of many American politicians in a speech
dedicating the NASA Space Exhibit at the Seattle World's Fair.
Cooperation in space could be the route to greater understanding
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Joint scientific
efforts might make other political areas easier to discuss, but the
burden of cooperative programs was a mutual one. The Vice President,
"with a spirit of cautious optimism," was able to tell his audience
"that the Soviet Union appears to realize that - in outer space, at
least - there may be something to be gained by cooperating with the
rest of humanity."35
Meanwhile, Dryden was preparing for the next
round of discussions with the Soviets, to be held at the end of May
in Geneva.36 Dryden was concerned about the political
considerations behind the Kennedy administration desire to discuss
collaboration; thus, he sought to determine the President's position.
Unfortunately, Dryden never had the opportunity to discuss the matter
directly with Kennedy or his top White House advisers. His closest
contact to the President was George C. McGhee at the State
Dryden, a scientist turned administrator
called upon to be an international negotiator, sat down with McGhee
on 18 May and asked him how the President wanted the negotiations
conducted. Were these discussions intended to arrive at true
cooperation, or were they only propaganda? Was it a sincere effort to
get negotiations going or merely something for public display? As
Dryden told McGhee, the nature of the goal "would make some
difference in the approach." McGhee assured Dryden that "the
President had in mind real cooperation, that he was as anxious to go
just as far as the Soviets would go." With the nature of his mission
somewhat more clear, Dryden made ready for his trip to
Dryden and Blagonravov met in Geneva on 27 May
1962. Both men had traveled to the Swiss city for the first meeting
of the Technical Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. While there was no direct connection between the
bilateral Soviet-American talks and the U.N. meeting, the negotiators
found such an occasion convenient to pursue their private
discussions. The two men, despite their obvious political
constraints, worked well together. In 12 days, they succeeded in
hammering out agreement on three points.**** 38
 As reported by
Frutkin, "this first agreement embraced three projects, following the
US proposals on meteorology and geomagnetism very closely and
reflecting Blagonravov's new interest in the Echo experiment in
satellite communications." The two principal negotiators were
satisfied with their progress. Dryden commented to reporters that
approval of the agreements by the American and Soviet governments
would mark an "important step" in space cooperation. At the joint
news conference on 8 June, Blagonravov added that they would have
been wasting their time if they had not "believed the work to be of
major significance."39 The two men departed to their respective capitals to
secure the necessary government approvals for their proposals.
The Dryden-Blagonravov agreement provided for
a two-month study period, during which either party could suggest
changes to the proposals. As it developed, neither country sought
amendments, and Soviet Academy President Keldysh and NASA
Administrator Webb exchanged letters on 18 and 30 October 1962 that
formalized the agreements.40 Much political and technical work lay ahead - work
that was hindered by the grave situation created by the discovery of
Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Cuba. # 41
When the joint announcement of the bilateral
space agreement was made to the U.N. on 5 December 1962, the somber
and tense days of October lingered in the minds of many American and
Soviet political figures. Indeed, the joint announcement had been
postponed until December because of a Presidential order during the
Cuban crisis decreeing "that there be no further action on the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. outer space bilateral until the Cuban situation has
been settled."42 An atmosphere of restraint accompanied the official
announcements when they were made. Administrator Webb indicated
This is an important step toward
cooperation among nations of the world to increase man's knowledge
and use of his special environment. The careful preparation for such
a joint cooperative effort made by Academician A. A. Blagonravov and
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden is a sound basis on which to proceed. The United
States will make every effort to facilitate this
The official Soviet news agency, Tass, stated
briefly: "There is no doubt that this agreement will make a great
contribution to the conquest of the universe
 and to the further advance of international
cooperation between scientists."44
The next step in implementing the agreements
called for creating joint working groups. To facilitate the
establishment of those technical parties, Dryden and Blagonravov met
in Rome on 11-20 March 1963 and again in Geneva during the following
May. The result of these two meetings was a document - the "First
Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space
Agreement of June 8, 1962."45 The details for the weather satellite launching and
the data exchange project were concluded with relative ease. But the
agreement on the communications satellite experiments with
was more difficult to arrange because of technical complexities.
Proposals for a coordinated launch of geophysical satellites to study
the earth's magnetic field were finalized at the May
The process for conducting the negotiations
followed an unofficial protocol, which established a precedent for
subsequent discussions. In Rome, the first two days were essentially
ceremonial. Following the formalities held first at the American
Embassy and then at the Soviet Embassy, the working sessions began.
Generally, the pattern of the meetings called for the discussion of
draft documents, during which the two negotiating teams compared
points and argued matters of substance and wording until an agreed
document was assembled in both English and Russian.47
In testimony before the Senate Committee on
Aeronautics and Space Sciences, Dryden reflected on the possible
motivations that underlay the Soviet decision to subscribe to these
cooperative agreements. It was Dryden's personal belief that "this
group of scientists who are interested in collaboration have been
given a hand to see what they can come up with." Both groups of
negotiators had decided that they "could not agree on anything which
did not show a benefit to both countries." Looking at the nature of
the joint discussions, Dryden felt that there was a "possibility that
the political elements in Russia may at some point shut this off."
Dryden was assuming, as did other American scientists, that
Blagonravov and his associates in the Soviet Academy represented
"what you might call a liberal group in Russia," which sought to
begin "limited cooperation within the
 political climate of their own country and of the
times."48 Frutkin, however, challenged the notion expressed by
Dryden and others that "technical cooperation does not involve a
party political line."49
The concept that scientists have a unique
position in the scheme of things, as a result of the international
character of their work, has a long history. Equally strong is "the
notion that the scientist can play a special role and effective role
in establishing and cementing improved relations among nations. . .
."50 In the post-World War II era, there has been a strong
feeling of internationalism within the community of science and
technology, especially in the U.S. where a number of scientists urged
their fellows to lead the way toward greater scientific cooperation
among nations. But among scientists, as among all peoples, there are
both internationalists and nationalists. Frutkin contends:
The evidence appears to be
overwhelming that scientists confronted with the exigencies of
national need have reacted much as other patriotic citizens,
professional and nonprofessional. In part, this follows from an
interaction between science and government which produces a rough
alignment even in democratic countries. International ties, real or
fancied, have not weighed in the balance in any significant way. . .
. When we say that science is international we mean that it is
international where scientific matters of essentially professional
character are concerned, and not really where political matters are
Thus, Dryden was correct in his report that
both teams of negotiators could only agree to those activities that
were of mutual benefit, but he may have been too generous in his
analysis when he said that politics did not influence technical
cooperation. Simply, in some areas of negotiations, politics were
less obtrusive than in other areas. Indeed, the passage of time would
show that there were political considerations behind all the
American public response to the 16 August 1963
announcement of the Soviet-American bilateral space agreement was
conditioned by the successful conclusion of the nuclear test ban
treaty and speculation over rumors of a joint manned space flight. On
25 July 1963, representatives of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom initialed a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere and space and under water; relaxation of nuclear
tension made the space agreement between the Americans and Soviets
seem all the more promising. A New York
Times article on the
Dryden-Blagonravov "Memorandum of Understanding" termed the idea of
cooperative manned space flights "a logical outgrowth of the present
agreement."52 Rumors circulated that there might possibly be a joint
lunar mission in the planning, speculation developed partly as a
result of the visit  of British
astronomer Sir Bernard Lovell. In the latter half of 1963, according
to Frutkin, there ensued in the story of U.S.- U.S.S.R. space
relationships "by all odds the strangest chapter. . . ."
* The American
delegation also included D. F. Hornig, J. W. Townsend, Jr., P. S.
Thacher, R. W. Porter, and L. Bowdin. The other Soviet participants
were Y. A. Barinov, G. S. Stashevsky, R. M. Timberbaev, and V. A.
** Project West Ford, a
USAF program conceived at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, involved
launching into earth orbit 350 million copper threads (17.78
millimeters long and 0.254 millimeters in diameter), which would
serve as reflector antennas for short wavelength communications
(8,000 megahertz). The experiment promised to make global radio
coverage invulnerable to jamming. Project West Ford, approved on 4
Oct. 1961 by the White House, met with mixed international scientific
reactions, being criticized by many scientists as a possible threat
to the study of radio astronomy or as an alteration to the
environment of space, but the project was praised by NATO politicians
as a significant deterrent defense system. On 10 May 1963, a second
attempt to orbit the disputed payload was successful; the dipoles
ejected and formed a compact cloud, circling the earth every 166
minutes in a near-polar orbit at a height of 3.704 kilometers.
on 16 Dec. reported that nearly all of Project West Ford's dipoles
had reentered the atmosphere.
*** Cosmonautics Day, 12
Apr., was created by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet not only to
celebrate the anniversary of Gagarin's first space flight but also to
remind the Soviet public and the world of the accomplishments and
goals of the Soviet space program. It has become annually customary
for Pravda and Izvestiya to feature
articles at this time written by the cosmonauts on different aspects
of space flight. Gagarin, until his death in an aircraft crash in
Mar. 1968, and Titov were frequent authors of items promoting
international peace and cooperation.
**** Frutkin in
International Cooperation in
Space gives a detailed account of the
negotiations and some of the difficulties encountered by Dryden and
# Kennedy publicly
announced on 22 Oct 1962 the presence in Cuba of Soviet missiles
capable of striking a large part of the U.S. A naval blockade was
imposed to intercept further shipments, and the President bluntly
demanded that the Soviets withdraw their missiles. By early November,
aerial reconnaissance showed that the Cuban bases were being
dismantled and the missiles crated for return to the U.S.S.R.
## For details of the
discussions, see Frutkin's International Cooperation in Space, pp. 97- 105. The co-chairmen of each of the three
Working Groups were as follows: Working Group 1 (weather) - M.
Tepper, Director, Program of Weather Satellite Applications, NASA,
and V. A. Bugayev, Director, Central Institute of Weather
Forecasting, U.S.S.R.; Working Group 2 (communications) - L. Jaffee,
Director, Communications Systems, NASA, and I. V. Klokov, Deputy
Minister of Communications, U.S.S.R.; and Working Group 3
(geomagnetic study) - L. Cahill, Director of Physics, Office of Space
Sciences, NASA, and Yu. D. Kalinin, Deputy Director of the Institute
of Terrestrial Magnetism, U.S.S.R.
20. See "Poslanie N. S.
Khrushcheva Prezidenty SShA Dzh. Kennedi" [Message of N. S.
Khrushchev to President of the USA John Kennedy], Pravda, 22 Mar.
1962; and "Kosmicheskie isspedovaniya-na sluzhbu delu mira, poslanie
N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidenty SShA Dzh. Kennedi" [Space investigation
- into the affairs of the world, message of N. S. Khrushchev to
President of the USA John Kennedy], Izvestiya, 22 Mar. 1962.
The American newspapers treated the exchange of letters at some
length. Milton Besser, "Soviet Says It Would Help Set up Satellite
Communications System," Washington
Post, 21 Mar. 1962; Thomas J.
Hamilton, "Soviet Promises Space Data to U.N.," New York Times, 21 Mar.
1962; "Khrushchev Accepts Bid for Cooperation in Space,"
New York Times, 22 Mar. 1962; "Russia Agrees to Plan for Joint Space
Ventures," Wall Street
Journal, 22 Mar.1962; Carroll
Kilpatrick, "U.S. and Soviet Move Toward Joint Space Use,"
Washington Post, 22 Mar. 1962; and "Joint Space Efforts," editorial,
Washington Post, 24 Mar. 1962.
21. Dryden, "Preliminary
Summary Report: U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Talks, New York, N.Y.,
March 27, 28, 30, 1962," 30 Mar. 1962; Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 95; and TWX, Adlai E. Stevenson to Secretary of
State, 21 Mar. 1962. Stevenson reported the Soviets felt that the
press treatment of the talks must be limited. The Soviets had "urged
that if [the] talks are to be fruitful, they cannot be conducted in a
22. Dryden, "Preliminary
Summary Report, U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Talks," p. 1. The NASA
position papers were attached to the Dryden report: "Tentative Basis
for Further Discussions of Meteorological Satellite Cooperation,"
"Tentative Basis for Further Discussions of Cooperation in Data
Acquisition," and "Tentative Basis for Further Discussions of Mapping
the Earths Magnetic Field."
International Cooperation in
Space, p. 95.
25. To follow the
dialogue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the subject of
"weather" and "propaganda" balloons, see in the Department of State Bulletin the following: correspondence and DoD press release, 8
Jan. 1956, p. 293; "Transcript of Secretary Duties News Conference,"
20 Feb. 1956, pp. 280-282; "Correspondence with U.S.S.R. Concerning
Weather Balloons," 20 Feb. 1956, pp. 293-295; "U.S. Restates Position
on Weather Balloons," 12 Mar. 1956, pp. 426- 428; text of 5 Sept.
1958 U.S. note, 29 Sept. 1958p. 504; and "U.S. Replies to Soviet Note
on Balloons" (10 Nov. 1958), pp. 739-740. Also, see "Balloons over
the Red World," America; National
Catholic Weekly Review, 18 Feb. 1956,
p. 547; "The Russians, Too," Newsweek, 12 Mar. 1956,
pp. 33-34; "Freedom Balloons Aimed" Science Newsletter, 25
Aug. 1951, p. 124; and "Iron Curtain Balloons," Flying, Dec. 1955, p.
26. Frutkin, "Topical
Summary of Bilateral Discussion with the Soviet Union, March 27-30,
1962," 1 May 1962, as cited in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C.
Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in
Space (Coral Gables, Fla., 1974), p.
94; [Frutkin], "Status of US/USSR Bilateral Space Talks," 21 Apr.
1962; [Robert F. Packard, memo for record, "Meeting with Under
Secretary McGhee Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space
Activities," 24 Apr. 1962; and NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology on
Science, Technology, and Policy, NASA
SP-4004 (Washington, 1964), p. 219. On 29 May 1963, a U.N.
subcommittee on space addressed the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space with the following message: the "urgency and
importance of the problem of preventing potentially harmful
interference with peaceful uses of outer space" cannot be
overemphasized. This warning, referring to the USAF-sponsored Project
West Ford communications experiment, had been initiated by the Soviet
delegate Anatoliy A. Blagonravov. He denounced the experiment as a
danger to other space studies, including flights by manned
satellites. This charge was denied by Homer E. Newell, Jr., a U.S.
27. Dryden to T. Keith
Glennan, 26 Apr. 1962, as cited in Harvey and Ciccoritti,
U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in
Space, p. 94; and Dryden to James A.
Van Allen, 20 Apr. 1962.
28. Howard Simons,
"U.S.-Russia Open Talks on Co-operation in Space," Washington Post, 28 Mar.
1962; Lawrence O'Kane, "U.S. and Soviet Start Space Talks,"
New York Times, 28 Mar. 1962; and "New Parley Slated on Space
Research," New York
Times, 31 Mar. 1962. Dryden commented
privately on the drafting of this statement. The Americans "proposed
to list the three specific projects on which agreement seemed
possible but the Soviet delegation wished either to include all
projects mentioned in the letters plus the reconnaissance satellite
item or none. . . ." Nevertheless, Dryden considered the Soviet
attitude businesslike and a "good sign," since "Blagonravov stated
that he favored the negotiation of agreements for those projects on
which we can agree as agreement is reached rather than attempting to
cover all projects in a single negotiation. Such a procedure appears
to dispose of the reconnaissance satellite pledge as a precondition
for agreements and is favorable to a fruitful outcome of the
negotiations." Dryden, "Preliminary Summary Report, U.S.-Soviet Space
raskroet tainy kosmosa" [Mankind gets back secrets from space],
Pravda, 10 Apr. 1962; and "Blizkie prostopi vselennoy, intervy c Yu.
Gagarinim i G. Titovim" [Near Space is Universal, an Interview with
Yu. Gagarin and G. Titov], Izvestiya, 12 Apr.
30. "Rech tovarishcha M.
V. Keldysha" [Speech by comrade M. V. Keldysh], Pravda, 13 Apr.
31. "Khrushchev Drops
Summit Pressure," New York
Times, 25 Apr. 1962.
32. Interview, Margaret
Chase Smith over radio, 1 Apr. 1962, as cited in U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Astronautical and Aeronautieal Events
of 1962, Report, 88th Cong., 1st
sess., 12 June 1963, p. 46.
33. U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, George P.
Miller, "Press Release," 23 Feb. 1962.
34. William E. Minshall
of Ohio reprinted the results of a poll of his constituents. Of some
20,000 respondents, 47 percent were opposed and 13.4 percent had no
opinion, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record,
87th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 108 (18 Apr. 1962), p. A3035.
35. Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Astronautical and
Aeronautical Events of 1962, p.
36. Dryden to Glennan,
28 Apr.1963, indicates that Dryden did not expect the meetings to
resume in Washington but in Geneva in May.
Dryden-Frutkin, Sohier, and Emme, 26 Mar. 1964, p. 23.
International Cooperation in
Space, p. 96. The full text of the
"Bilateral Space Agreement between the US and the USSR," together
with letters of transmittal and news releases, are presented in
Department of State
Bulletin, 24 Dec. 1962, pp. 962-965.
The agreement took shape much as Dean Rusk had predicted, Rusk to
Kennedy, memo, 15 May 1962:
. . . the Soviets prefer to
develop such arrangements on a step-by-step basis, not on the basis
of an overall formal agreement between the two governments. Further,
the Soviets are apparently interested in working primarily within
multilateral programs (i.e., those of the World Meteorological
Organization and the International Telecommunications Union), but on
the basis of prior US-USSR agreement. It appears unlikely that
significant joint effort in outer space activities will develop in
the near term, but there is a prospect that the Soviets will agree to
some modest cooperation in the form of coordinated satellite launch
schedules, compatible instrumentation and some additional exchange of
39. "U.S.-Russian Pact
on Weather Probes Drafted in Geneva," New York Times, 9 June
1962; "Joint Communique on US-USSR Talks," 8 June 1962; and Packard
to E. C. Welsh, H. L. Dryden, J. B. Wiesner, W. P. Bundy, F. W.
Reichelderfer, and H. Scoville, memo, "Meeting with Under Secretary
McGhee Concerning U.S.USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities," 12
June 1962, with attachments, "Dryden-Blagonravov Memorandum," 8 June
1962, and "Joint Communique." The Americans participating in the
Geneva talks who had not been in New York City were Furnas, Wexler,
Heppner, and Valdes. The Soviet delegation consisted of Blagonravov,
Barinov, Stashevsky, Klokov, Kalinin, and Bugaev.
40. James E. Webb to
Keldysh, 30 Oct. 1962; "Bilateral Space Agreement between the US and
the USSR," Department of State
Bulletin, 24 Dec. 1962, pp. 964-965;
and John W. Finney, "U.S. Prods Soviet on Space Accord,"
New York Times, 20 Sept. 1962.
41. Considering the
political climate, Dryden had little difficulty in setting up the
next meeting with Blagonravov, Dryden to Blagonravov, 11 Dec. 1963;
and McGeorge Bundy to George C. McGhee, memo, "Bilateral Cooperation
with the USSR in Outer Space Activities," 10 Dec. 1963. In
Blagonravov to Dryden, 7 Jan. 1963, the Soviet representative asked
that the meeting be scheduled for March rather than January as
proposed by Dryden. In Dryden to Blagonravov, 21 Jan. 1963, Dryden
agreed to the postponement but requested that a larger number of
technical experts be present so the talks could be "more substantial
and expeditious." See also Dryden to Donald F. Hornig, 21 Jan.
42. Richard J. H.
Barnes, Acting Director, International Programs, to Webb and Robert
C. Seamans, Jr., memo, "US-USSR Bilaterals," 1 Nov. 1962. Barnes
commented on Webbs letter to Keldysh of 30 Oct.:
State understands that the Webb
reply to Keldysh was sent by international registered mail Tuesday
evening, October 30 and that Dr. Dryden was undertaking last night to
notify Congressmen Miller and Fulton, and Senators Smith, Cannon, and
Kerr, of the exchange of correspondence and the White House embargo
on publicity. Both actions had been authorized by Undersecretary
McGhee, and State had urged that the Congressional Committee members
be informed yesterday because of the news stories and yesterdays
editorial in the Washington Post.
See also "Light in Space?" editorial,
Washington Post, 31 Oct. 1962; and John W. Finney, "Space Pact Nearer
for U.S. and Russia," New York
Times, 30 Oct. 1962.
43. NASA News Release
62-257, "US-USSR Join in Outer Space Program," 5 Dec. 1962.
44. Tass International
Service, 8 Dec. 1962.
45. "First Memorandum of
Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8,
1962, between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration of the US," together with news
releases and correspondence, is reproduced in Department of State Bulletin, 9 Sept. 1963, pp. 404-410.
International Cooperation in
Space, pp. 97-105; [Joint U.S.-USSR
news release], "Progress Made in US-USSR Space Talks," 20 Mar. 1963;
and "U.S.-Soviet Agree to Program for Weather Probes in Space,"
New York Times, 21 Mar. 1963.
47. NASA News Release,
HQ [unnumbered], "News Media Briefing: Joint US-USSR Talkson
Cooperative Space Research Projects Held in Rome, Italy," 25 Mar.
1963, pp. 8-9.
48. U.S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964: Hearings on S.
1245, Pt. 1., 88th Cong., 1st sess.,
1963, pp. 33-34; and John W. Finney, "Conflicts Peril Accord on
Space," New York Times, 28 Apr. 1963.
49. Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA
Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964, p.
International Cooperation in
Space, p. 12.
51. Ibid., pp.
52. "Kommunike o
podnisanii drugimi gosudarstvami dogovora o zapreshchenii ispitanii
yadernoga oruzhiya v atmosfere, v kosmicheckom prostranstve i pod
vodoy" [Communique about other countries signing the agreement on
forbidding the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and under
water], Pravda, 17 Aug. 1963; "V imya progressa, sovetsko-amerikanskoe
sotrudnichestvo v mirnom osvoenii kosmosa" [In the name of progress,
Soviet-American collaboration in the peaceful use of space],
Izvestiya, 17 Aug. 1963; and Robert C. Toth, "U.S. and Russia
Agree to Share Satellite Data." New
York Times, 17 Aug. 1963.